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Abstract
We focus on adversarial patrolling games on an arbitrary graph, in
which the Defender can control a mobile resource and the targets are
alarmed by an alarm system, while the Attacker can observe the move-
ments of the mobile resource of the Defender, and, exploiting multiple
attacking resources, perform different sequential attacks against the tar-
gets. This scenario captures, e.g., the terroristic assaults in Paris in 2015.
It can be modelled as a zero-sum extensive-form game in which each player
can play multiple times. The game tree is exponentially large both in the
size of the graph and in the number of resources available to the Attacker.
We show that, when the number of the Attacker’s resources is free, the
problem of computing the equilibrium path is NP-hard even if the At-
tacker is restricted to play all her resources simultaneously, while, when
the number of resources is fixed, the equilibrium path can be computed
in polynomial time. In particular, we provide a dynamic-programming
algorithm that, given the number of the Attacker’s resources, computes
the equilibrium path requiring polynomial time in the size of the graph
and exponential time in the number of the resources. Furthermore, since
in real-world scenarios it is implausible that the Defender perfectly knows
the number of resources of the Attacker, we study the robustness of the
Defender’s strategy when she makes a wrong guess about that number.
We show that even the error of just a single resource, either underesti-
mating or overestimating the number of the Attacker’s resources, can lead
to an arbitrary inefficiency, when the inefficiency is defined, as usual, as
the ratio of the Defender’s utilities obtained with a wrong guess and a
correct guess. We argue that, in this case, a more suitable definition of
inefficiency is given by the difference of the Defender’s utilities. With
this definition, we observe that the higher the error in the estimation, the
higher the loss for the Defender. Then, we investigate the performance of
online algorithms when no information about the Attacker’s resources is
available, showing that there are no competitive deterministic algorithms.
Finally, we resort to randomized online algorithms showing that we can
obtain a competitive factor that is twice better than the one that can be
achieved by any deterministic online algorithm.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the first security game in which an Attacker can ob-
serve the movements of a patroller on an arbitrary graph and perform different
attacks, either simultaneous or sequential, exploiting multiple resources. Differ-
ently with respect to security games customarily studied in the literature, here
we model our problem as a 2-player extensive-form game, with each player able
to play multiple times. The defending agent, hereafter called Defender, has a
single mobile resource she can move along an arbitrary graph to protect some
valuable vertices, called targets. Moreover, each target is covered by an alarm
system capable of raising a different alarm signal for every target that is under
attack. On the other side, there is an Attacker, equipped with multiple attack-
ing resources and able to observe the actions undertaken by the Defender. The
goal of the Attacker is to perform the highest damage, employing the resources
to perform any type of attack, adopting any sequential strategy or using all of
them simultaneously. This latter case exactly reflects what happened during
the terroristic attacks in Paris 2015, as argued below.
1.1 Motivating Scenario
To illustrate how our model can be used to tackle real-world problems, we
propose a simple but concrete example that perfectly fits, namely the series of
terroristic assaults that affected Paris in 2015. On November 13, 2015, in Paris,
six attacks were performed across all the city: one near the Stade de France,
three very close to each other, at the intersection of Rue Bichat and Rue Alibert,
in Rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi and at the Bataclan theatre, and the last two in
Rue de Charonne and in Boulevard Voltaire. For simplicity, we focus on the
three that happened close to each other, both in space and time. Figure 1 shows
the locations in which these three attacks happened: specifically, Figure 1(a)
shows the actual map of the city of Paris, while Figure 1(b) shows a possible
graph representing the part of the city on which our game could be played.
Notice that the longest distance, namely the one between 1©, at the intersection
between Rue Bichat and Rue Alibert, and 3©, The Bataclan theatre, is about
1150 meters.
To model the situation represented in Figure 1, we designed in Figure 1(b),
t1, t2, t3 as the attacked locations (targets), while D is the starting point of the
Defender. The weights of the edges provide the distances among the various
places while the penetration times d, i.e., the time needed by the Attacker to
complete the attack, have been set taking into account how easy it could be to
hide and run away after having committed a crime in those places.
1.2 Original Contributions
In this work, we tackle the problem of facing multiple attacks in adversarial
patrolling games when the graph is arbitrary and utilities are zero-sum. Given
such setting, our goal is to provide the Defender with the optimal strategy to
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(b) Paris graph
Figure 1: Terroristic attacks in Paris, 2015.
protect the valuable nodes. Although the model we propose can be refined along
a number of dimensions, e.g., uncertainty over the alarm signals (introducing
false negatives/positives) or multiple defensive resources, we show that even the
study of the basic version is involved and completely unexplored in the literature
so far. To the best of our knowledge, sequential attacks, intended as different
attacks happening in the same game, are studied only in patrolling games with
very restricted environments [48] and in cyber-security games, where no graph
constraints are present [55]. The challenge of our task is due to the high interac-
tion level among the players, e.g., the Attacker could use some resources to make
the patroller move away from some valuable targets and, subsequently, carry an
attack against those targets once the Defender has run away. In principle, an
equilibrium can be found in polynomial time in the size of the game tree, but,
here, the game tree induced by the model is exponentially large in the size of the
graph and the number of resources available to the Attacker. When the number
of resources is a fixed parameter, the problem admits an algorithm capable of
finding the strategies on the equilibrium path requiring polynomial time in the
size of the graph. Conversely, we show that there is no algorithm requiring
polynomial time in the number of Attacker’s resources, unless P = NP, even in
the simplified case in which the Attacker uses all her resources simultaneously.
The computation of the equilibrium strategies requires the common knowledge
about the number of Attacker’s resources However, this information is unlikely
to be common. Customarily, in that case, Bayesian games are used, but this
approach appears unsuitable here where it would require that the game tree
contains a subtree for each possible number of resources of the Attacker. For
this reason, we investigate a different problem: the robustness of a Defender’s
strategy when the guess about the number of resources the Attacker can em-
ploy is wrong. We evaluate the worst-case inefficiency of this strategy showing
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that can be arbitrary even when the guess is a wrong estimate—both over and
under—for just a single resource. This happens when the inefficiency is defined
as the ratio of the Defender’s utilities obtained with a wrong guess and a correct
guess. When instead the inefficiency is defined as the difference between those
utilities, in an -Nash equilibrium fashion, the higher the error in the estimation,
the higher the loss. Furthermore, we investigate the use of online algorithms
to adopt when no information is available to the Defender. We provide a tight
upper bound over the competitive factor when non-stochastic online algorithms
are used, and we show that the competitive factor can be improved by resorting
to randomization.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief state of
the art of Security Games and discusses the principal works related to ours, while
Section 3 introduces the basic model on which we build ours and the results
we exploit from the literature. Section 4 presents our model, characterizing
its main features and introducing the presence of multiple attacking resources.
Then, we focus on the Attacker, who may perform multiple attacks: Section 5
studies what happen if she can perform simultaneous attacks while Section 6
generalizes such cases, enabling the Attacker to perform different sequential
attacks. In Section 7, we investigate scenarios in which the Defender does
not know a priori the number of resources available to the Attacker. Finally,
Section 8 concludes the work and presents the future research lines that we will
investigate. Section A provides a table summarizing the main symbols adopted
throughout the paper.
2 State of the Art
Here we introduce the principal works related to ours. First, we briefly introduce
Security Games in Section 2.1, then in Section 2.2 we focus on Patrolling Games,
ours being one of them. Finally, in Section 2.3, we present the works that are
the most related to ours, except the works [10, 11, 12], which we discuss in detail
in Section 3 where we introduce our patrolling model.
2.1 Security Games
The birth of the first Security Game (SG) is due to John Von Neumann, with
the Hide and Seek Game [28]. The scenario is the following: a player hides in
a place among a finite number of them, and the (unique) opponent should find
her. It is modeled as a normal-form zero-sum game, as the goals of the two
players are precisely one the opposite of the other.
From this simple game, many directions have been investigated, originating
a lot of papers in the following years, where some fugitives are escaping from
pursues that want to reach them [1]. If the fugitive tries to reach a target,
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e.g., a vanishing point, while the pursuer has to stop her, we have Ambush
Games [43] while if the fugitive hides and the pursuers look for her, we have
Search Games [30]. Finally, if both fugitives and pursues can move in the
environment, we call them Infiltration Games [5].
These studies evolved in research about strategic resource allocation for secu-
rity, which has been a very prolific domain in the field of algorithmic game theory
during the last years. The investigation in this domain led to the development
of what today are commonly called Security Games (SGs): game-theoretical
frameworks for computing resource allocation strategies against adversarial se-
curity threats. Security is one of the most critical issues every country and every
person deals with every day: the protection of airports, ports, banks, monu-
ments, and museums, but also containing urban attacks, controlling poaching
of endangering species, preventing the diffusion of misinformation and guaran-
teeing cybersecurity [34].
Customarily, SGs are a mathematical tool to model the protection of in-
frastructures or open environments as a non-cooperative game between a De-
fender and an Attacker. Given the setting, these scenarios take place under a
Stackelberg (a.k.a. leader-follower) paradigm [50], where the Defender (leader)
commits to a strategy and the Attacker (follower) first observes such commit-
ment, then best responds to it. From a computational perspective, as dis-
cussed in [21], finding a leader-follower equilibrium is computationally tractable
in games with one follower and complete information, while it becomes hard
in Bayesian games with different types of Attacker. The availability of such
computationally tractable aspects of Security Games led to the development of
algorithms capable of scaling up to huge problems, making them deployable in
the security enforcing systems of several real-world applications.
There have been several applications based on such games, and we describe
some of them. The first one to be deployed is ARMOR, consisting in the strate-
gic placement of checkpoints on the streets leading to the Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport (LAX) and the management of the patrolling units across the ter-
minals [40, 41]. The authors cast the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game,
giving the guards the possibility to assign different and appropriate weights to
their actions and tune them with respect to the types of the adversary. In [49],
the problem of scheduling undercover air marshals on U.S. domestic flights has
been tackled with the project IRIS. Here, additional constraints have been in-
troduced, since the agents must fly among cities such that, the next day, they
will depart from the same city they landed the day before. Moreover, the agents
are scheduled to have a list of cities such that the first and last cities are the
same so that they actually fly around following a circle.
In the same year, new models and algorithms were designed to deal with
more complex and more realistic instances [35]. The authors proposed a compact
way of representing a security game, thus obtaining an exponential improvement
both in the running time and the memory space needed by the algorithms to
solve such problems.
In 2012, game-theoretic techniques were adopted to secure ports, bridges,
and ferries, giving the U.S. Coast Guard patrols the best tours they should
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follow to protect such areas [9]. Since patrols have a fixed duration during the
day, it was not possible to model each target as a node in a graph, as it is
customarily done, because of the size of the problem, having a large number of
targets to be considered. The solution was to define patrol areas, i.e., groups
of nearby targets, which lead the Coast Guard to redefine the set of defensive
activities to be performed. Moreover, this is one of the first deployed projects
in which there is an assumption of non-perfect rationality of the Attacker.
GUARDS is another prominent project, which builds upon ARMOR and
IRIS [42]. The goal is the protection of an airport at a national scale. The
authors introduced the possibility of dealing with hundreds of heterogeneous
security activities to be able to prevent several potential threats with a system
designed for hundreds of end-users.
With TRUSTS [23], the authors designed a security game to schedule city
guards to stop fare evasion in Los Angeles Metro. Each day, TRUSTS generates
a patrol schedule for a team of inspectors, consisting of a sequence of fare-
check operations, alternating between in-station and on-train operations. Each
operation indicates specifically where and when a patrol unit should check fares.
They used Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) as a compact representation to
model each Defender unit’s patrol actions.
In addition to these projects, which are still deployed, Security Games have
been adopted for many different situations. With respect to airport security, new
games have been studied to perform an effective screening for threats, checking
both objects and people before they enter the airport (similarly, they could be
applied to a cargo container or stadium screening) [18, 44]. The challenge is to
find a dynamic approach for randomized screening, allowing for more effective
use of limited resources while improving the level of security. The authors de-
signed Threat Screening Games (TSGs), where there is a set of scarce resources
to screen and check several individuals or objects. The proposed approach,
GATE, applies to Bayesian general-sum TSGs.
The protection of water from toxic materials has been studied in [29]. In
some countries, despite government regulations on leather tannery waste emis-
sions, inspection agencies do not have enough resources to control the prob-
lem, and tanneries’ toxic wastewaters have a destructive impact on surrounding
ecosystems and communities. NECTAR has been proposed as the first security
game application to generate environmental compliance inspection schedules.
Still related to water-life, in [53], the authors proposed a method to protect
coral reefs, which are valuable and fragile ecosystems, constantly under threat
from human activities, e.g., coral mining. Many countries have built marine pro-
tected areas and protect their ecosystems through boat patrol, and efficiently
schedule these patrols is a perfect application for security games.
In [33], a new game to study the behavior of the Defender with respect to
multiple independent adversaries is proposed. In fact, collusion among malicious
agents is very common in every domain, including airports and wildlife security.
The authors study whether it could be more convenient for a group of Attackers
to break up collusion by playing off the self-interest of individual adversaries.
Preventing crimes or terrorist attacks in urban areas is the problem that
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has been tackled in [54]. Guards must respond very quickly to be able to
intercept and catch a potential Attacker on her escaping route, which could
depend on time-dependent traffic conditions on transportation networks. The
primary challenge here consists of the presence of time constraints both on the
Defender and the Attacker side.
Very recently, Security Games have been applied to stop the nuclear smug-
gling in international container shipping through advanced inspection facili-
ties [52]. Efficiency and efficacy are fundamental for this task, given that there
are millions of containers, which should be screened. This work models the in-
teraction between an inspector and a smuggler using of a security game, formu-
lating the smuggler’s sequential decision behavior as a Markov Decision Process.
All the above works necessarily work with a discrete and finite number of
strategies per player, often not explicitly taking into account the underlying
topology of the space in which targets are located. However, in many practical
security settings, defense resources can be located on a continuous plane, and
so defense solutions are improved by placing resources in a space outside of
actual targets (e.g., between targets). To address this limitation, the authors
proposed Security Game on a Plane, where targets and defensive resources are
distributed on a 2-dimensional plane, able to protect targets within a certain
effective distance [32].
The papers listed above deal with physical security. Recently, game-theoretic
techniques have also been applied to cyber security. In [24, 25], the authors study
the problem of protecting a network in which an administrator may decide the
best security measures to use to improve the safety of the network. This is
achieved by resorting to honeypots, i.e., decoy services or hosts, placed by the
Defender, while the Attacker chooses the best response as a contingency attack
policy.
Still in a cybersecurity dimension, [45] proposes an approach to investigate
whether alerts generated by potential cyber attacks are real attacks or just false
positives. Also here, the magnitude of the problem is high, with a number of
alerts that is overwhelming with respect to the number of analysts that can
check the authenticity of such attacks.
It is immediate to observe that Security Games have tons of applications.
In the next section, we focus on Patrolling Games, i.e., games in which the
Defender controls a mobile resource that can catch the Attacker.
2.2 Patrolling Security Games
In this work, we focus on a specific class of security games, called Patrolling
Security Games (PSGs). These games are modeled as infinite-horizon extensive
form games in which the Defender controls one or more patrollers moving within
an environment, represented as a finite graph. In [14], the authors provide the
formulation of a Security Game in which the Defender controls a mobile resource
moving in the environment between adjacent areas, while the Attacker can ob-
serve the movements of the patrollers at any time and use such information in
deciding the most convenient time and target location to attack
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When multiple mobile resources are available to the Defender, coordinating
them at best is, in general, a hard task which, besides computational aspects,
must also keep into account communication issues [16]. In this work, the authors
determined the smallest number of robots needed to patrol a given environment
and computed the optimal patrolling strategies along several coordination di-
mensions, e.g., the strategy of a robot can or cannot depend on the strategies
of the other robots and the environment can or cannot be partitioned.
However, the patrolling problem is tractable, even with multiple patrollers,
in border security (e.g., linear and cycle graphs), when patrollers have homoge-
neous moving and sensing capabilities and all the vertices composing the border
share the same features [4]. Scaling this model involved the study of how to
compute patrolling strategies in scenarios where the Attacker is allowed to per-
form multiple attacks [48]. Similarly, coordination strategies among multiple
Defenders are investigated in [3].
In [51], the authors study the case in which there is a temporal discount
on the targets, i.e., the value of the targets diminishes as time passes by, both
for the Attacker and the Defender. Extensions are discussed in [46], where
coordination strategies between Defenders that must execute joint activities are
explored, in [31], where a resource can cover multiple targets, and in [2] where
attacks can be detected at different stages with different associated utilities.
Patrolling has always been a fundamental research line in robotics: in [7],
for the first time, a security game has been explicitly cast in this domain. Pro-
tecting sites against intrusions is a topic of increasing importance, and robotic
systems for autonomous patrolling have been developed in the last years. How-
ever, unpredictable strategies are not always efficient in getting the patroller a
large expected utility. Here, exploiting a model of the adversary in a game the-
oretic framework, the authors provide a method to find the optimal strategies,
modeling a given patrolling situation as an extensive-form game. In [15], the
model is refined, capturing patroller’s augmented sensing capabilities and a pos-
sible delay in the intrusion. In [8], the authors conducted realistic experiments
by using USARSim [19], to study the behavior of the optimal patrolling strategy
both in situations that violate its idealized assumptions and in comparison with
other patrolling strategies.
A significant contribution comes from [13], where it is proposed the first
study on the use of abstractions in security games (specifically for PSGs) to
design scalable algorithms. The authors defined some classes of abstractions and
provided parametric algorithms to automatically generate such abstractions,
which allow one to relax the constraint of patrolling strategies’ Markovianity, a
usual assumption in PSGs, and to solve large game instances.
Higher degrees of interaction between the players by means of a sequential
structure were explored, e.g., in [6, 39]: the authors analytically determined
the value of the game or bounds on the value, for various classes of graphs,
especially where the network is a line, which models the problem of guarding a
channel or protecting a border from infiltration.
Finally, [37] proposes a first skeleton model of an alarm system where sensors
and the authors analyze how sensory information can improve the effectiveness
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of patrolling strategies in adversarial settings with the Attacker able to perform
a single attack. They show that, when sensors are not affected by false nega-
tives and false positives, the best strategy prescribes that the patroller responds
to an alarm signal rushing to the target under attack without patrolling the
environment. As a consequence, in such cases the model treatment becomes
trivial.
2.3 Related Works
Here, we present the works that are closely related to ours.
Green Security Games (GSGs). These games constitute a novel game
model where a generalized Stackelberg assumption is made [26]. As it happens
in our game model, the Attacker can perform multiple attacks. However, GSGs
are repeated games in which, at each repetition, the same game is played. Differ-
ently, in our game model, players play a unique (non-repeated game) on a game
tree. Furthermore, we adopt the common full-rationality assumption made in
game-theoretic frameworks, while in GSGs a bounded rationality assumption is
made. Such assumption is central in the application domain to which Green
Security Games apply. Conversely, our primary focus is on studying the worst
case, thus playing against a rational adversary. Our work is different from works
dealing with such problem, e.g., [38]: in our model, as it is common in real-world
applications, the Attacker needs multiple turns to conquer a target while in [38]
only one-shot attacks are considered, without the possibility of deceiving the
Defender.
Stochastic Games. Our game model would reduce to a stochastic game [20]
if we force that the strategies of the players to depend on a history of observa-
tions that is somehow bounded, e.g., depending only on the current vertex in
which the patroller is. However, in this case, the optimal strategy—that can
be obtained by solving a stochastic game—could be arbitrarily inefficient with
respect to the optimal unconstrained strategy.
Attack Graph Games (AGGs). This class of games exploits a particular
structure, called attack graph (AG), to represent a vast space of sequential
Attacker’s actions. Specifically, an AG is a directed AND/OR graph consisting
of fact nodes F (OR) and action nodes A (AND), where every action node has
preconditions, i.e., facts that must be true before the action can be performed,
and effects, namely a set of facts that become true if the action is successfully
executed. These relations are represented by edges in the attack graph [24, 25].
However, as we have already pointed out, the graph in our model represents the
environment in which the game is played and not just the possible actions of the
Attacker. Moreover, the authors consider the detection of cybersecurity attacks
using honeypots, which are static; conversely, our defending resource can patrol
among the areas of the environment.
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Notice that none of the previous works considers the introduction of an alarm
system capable of providing additional information to the Defender. Thanks to
an alarm system, for the first time, the patroller can exploit dynamic information
against multiple attacks that can be carried out sequentially, moving according
to how the attacks are performed. Conversely, all the other works rely on
observations made during the patrolling and other prior knowledge.
3 Background
The problem we study builds upon some results provided in [10, 11, 12]. We
briefly introduce the basic model in Section 3.1, while in Section 3.2 we report
the main results available in the literature that we exploit in our paper. Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses how the results presented in our work relate to the results
known in the literature.
3.1 Basic Model
There is an environment to be patrolled, modeled as a graph, in which the
vertices represent different areas of the environment and the edges represent the
connections among such areas. All the edges require one turn to be traversed.
We define the set of targets as the set of valuable nodes, characterized by a
value and a penetration time, i.e., the time needed to be compromised. An
alarm system generates a signal whenever a target is under attack.
A 2-player security game is played by an Attacker A and a Defender D. In
this game, A seeks to gain value by compromising some targets while D controls
one single patroller by specifying a movement strategy for it. The game can be
formulated as an extensive-form infinite-horizon zero-sum game, with A and
D playing alternatively. Each turn is constituted by one action for the Attacker
and the subsequent action for the Defender.
3.2 Previous Results
In [12], the alarm system is affected by spatial uncertainty, i.e., the alarm system
is uncertain about the exact target under attack. The actions of the Attacker
correspond to the targets, while the actions of the Defender are the so-called
covering routes, i.e., finite sequences of vertices such that each target traversed
while following the routes is reached within its penetration time.
Given that there are no false positives nor false negatives, the problem can be
split into two games, namely the Signal Response Game (SRG) and Patrolling
Game (PG). The SRG captures the situation in which the Defender is in some
vertex v and the Attacker attacked a target, while the PG models the case
in which the Defender moves in the absence of an alarm signal. The authors
proved that solving an SRG is NP-hard even with a single signal. In the PG, the
best strategy results standing in a vertex, waiting for an alarm signal, and best
responding to it. Finding a patrolling strategy for the Defender is FNP-hard if
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the graph is a tree and APX-hard if the structure of the environment is arbi-
trary. The authors proposed an exact algorithm (SolveSRG) whose complexity
is O(2|T | · |T |5), where |T | is the number of targets in the graph.
In [10], the authors study the scenario in which the Defender is allowed to
control multiple resources and alarms are affected only by spatial uncertainty.
As in the case of a single resource, the best strategy of the Defender is to strate-
gically place the resources, wait for a signal and then move them accordingly.
The authors study the computational complexity of finding the minimum num-
ber of resources needed to protect an environment, i.e., the resources are located
such that no target is far from a resource more than its penetration time. Fur-
thermore, the authors provide exact and approximation algorithms to find the
best Defender’s strategy.
In [11], the authors focus on the case in which the Defender has a single
resource, and the alarm system is affected by false negatives, such that, even
though an attack is carried on, an alarm signal may not be raised. In this sce-
nario, standing in a vertex until an alarm arises may be an arbitrarily inefficient
strategy. Instead, the best strategy may prescribe that the patroller also moves
before some signal arises. The authors focus on the study of strategies that can
be computed in practice.
3.3 New Challenge
In Table 1, we classify the results already known in the literature together with
our original contributions, denoted with ‘×’.
Perfect alarm Spatial uncertainty Spatial uncertainty
and false negatives
Single D–Single A [12] [12] [11]
Multi D–Single A [10] [10]
Single D–Multi A ×
Table 1: Known results and our contribution (denoted by ‘×’).
4 Problem Formulation
In this section we introduce our model: Section 4.1 introduces the patrolling
setting, while Section 4.2 describe the game mechanism.
4.1 Patrolling Setting
Our game is modeled by the model introduced in Section 3.1. Differently, from
that model, we allow the Defender D to exploit information gained from a
perfect alarm system and the Attacker A to control k resources, which can
be employed simultaneously or sequentially. We model the environment as a
graph G = (V,E) with unitary edges. ω∗i,j denotes the smallest traveling cost
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in turns between vertices i and j. T ⊆ V is the set of targets characterized by
a value pi(t) ∈ (0, 1] and a penetration time d(t) ∈ N+. A perfect alarm system
generates a signal si if and only if target ti is under attack. Any generated
signal si is common knowledge. Since each signal corresponds exactly to one
target and vice versa, we can safely refer to the signals triggered by the alarm
system directly by the targets under attack. The Attacker can use k resources,
while D controls one single patroller.
4.2 Game Mechanism
Attacker A and Defender D play alternatively in an extensive-form infinite-
horizon zero-sum game. Each turn is constituted by one action for the At-
tacker and the subsequent action for the Defender. At each turn τ , the At-
tacker may decide to wait or to attack, with an attack being characterized by
the pair (τ, attacked(τ)) where τ is the turn at which the attack begins1 and
attacked(τ) ⊆ T is the the support of the attack, i.e., the set of the attacked
targets. Once A has employed a resource to make an attack, such a resource
lays on the target until the attack is concluded. Moreover, each resource can be
employed just once by A. On the other hand, D observes the signals triggered
by the alarm system (if any) and decides whether to keep its resource in the
same area or to move it along the graph. We assume the Defender places her
patrolling resource in the environment before the first attack is performed. The
choice of such placement is part of the solution to the problem. The utilities of
D and A are
(
−∑ki=1 γi pi(ti),∑ki=1 γi pi(ti)), where γi = 0 if A attacks target
ti at τ and the patroller traverses ti by d(t) turns after τ , catching the attack-
ing resource, otherwise, if A completes the attack on target ti without being
detected, γi = 1. Once a resource of A attacking target t has been detected
by D, the resource is discarded from the game and, in principle, A can attack
target t again in future using another resource (if any available). Similarly, a
target can be successfully compromised only once, after that it is considered as
a vertex without any value. Finally, if D protects the environment from all the
attacks, her utility is zero, corresponding to the maximum utility she can get.
Otherwise, for each target successfully compromised, D loses the value of such
target.
In the following sections, first, we study the restricted case in which A de-
ploys all the resources simultaneously. Notice that this restriction induces the
game to be finite and thus the equilibrium can be computed before the game
is played. Subsequently, we study the unrestricted case. Remarkably, in that
case, the game tree may be arbitrarily large—A may wait indefinitely before
making an attack—and therefore there is no way to find an equilibrium before
the execution of the game. Nevertheless, we show that, once k is fixed, there is a
polynomial time algorithm to find the equilibrium path. Thus, for small values
of k, D can compute the equilibrium path before the play and apply it and,
1We assume A can instantly reach the attacked target. This can be relaxed as shown
in [15].
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if A behaves irrationally not following the equilibrium path, D can compute
on-the-flight the equilibrium path of the subgame she is playing.
5 Facing Simultaneous Attacks
First, we study the restricted case in which A attacks employing all the k re-
sources simultaneously. Tackling such problem is functional to solve the general
case with sequential attacks. Since A does not pay any cost to use the resources,
it easily follows that she will use all of them, each for a different target. When
the attacks take place, being simultaneous, k signals will be raised, and the
Defender must compute a path along the graph to protect the corresponding
targets. W.l.o.g., we assume the attack to begin at τ = 0. In this case, we
can safely adopt covering routes as actions for the Defender2. We introduce the
formal definition.
Definition 1 (Direct route) Given attacked(0), a direct route is a sequence
r = (r(0), r(1), . . . , r(h)) of arbitrary finite length h, where r(0) is any vertex
of G and r(i) is any target in attacked(0).
A direct route can be instantiated to a graph walk starting from r(0) and
traveling any shortest path between r(i) and r(i + 1). For any i ∈ {1, . . . , h},
call A(r(i)) =
∑i−1
l=0 ω
∗
r(l),r(l+1) the time required by the walk to go from r(0) to
r(i). Notice that here we call direct routes sequences of nodes that in Section 3.2
were called routes. This is needed since we will have to generalize the concept
of route in the following (see Section 6.1, Definition 5).
Definition 2 (Covering route) A direct route r is a covering route, denoted
as rc, if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, it holds A(r(i)) ≤ d(r(i)).
Any other target t not appearing in the direct route is not visited or visited
after d(t) turns from the start of the attack.
The resolution approach for k = 1 is easy, being a sub-case of the problem
studied in [12]. More precisely, the best strategy for the patroller is to stay on
a vertex v, wait for a signal s associated with a target t and, when raised, move
towards t along the shortest path connecting v to t. The problem can be solved
in polynomial time in |V |.
To deal with multiple attacking resources, we first have to figure out the
space of the actions available to A and D. The Attacker can attack any subset
of k targets, i.e., her actions are all the possible combinations of k targets among
|T | targets, (|T |k ) ≈ |T |k in total. On the other side, the Defender must compute
the covering routes for the attacked(0) targets under attack. As it can be seen,
the space of the actions is exponential both on the side of D and of A. Thus,
it is natural to wonder whether we have to enumerate all of them or if we
2This holds because, as it will be proved in Theorem 1, the problem of protecting targets
from a single attack with a spatial uncertain alarm system can be mapped to the problem
with a punctual alarm system and simultaneous attacks.
13
can find a compact way to express them. On the Attacker side, we can adopt
marginal strategies, i.e., A plays directly on the targets, and then, exploiting
the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [17], as done in [36], we map the correlated
strategy back to a feasible mixed strategy. Thus, her space of actions can be
exponentially compressed. Conversely, nothing can be done for the Defender,
being the computation of a covering route a NP-hard problem also in our novel
setting and therefore there is no algorithm running in polynomial time in k,
unless P = NP.
Definition 3 (Simultaneous-Attack problem (SA-v)) The Simultaneous-
Attack problem is defined as follows.
• INSTANCE: an instance of our problem with the patroller in a given vertex
v, with attacked(0) targets attacked simultaneously by A;
• QUESTION: does attacked(0) admit any covering route rc?
Theorem 1 SA-v is NP-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from COV-SET, which is proved being NP-hard
in [12].
Definition 4 The COV-SET problem is defined as:
• INSTANCE: an instance of SRG-v with a target set T ;
• QUESTION: is T a covering set? (Equivalently, does T admit any cover-
ing route r?)
Mapping. We map an instance of COV-SET to an instance of SA-v by
constructing attacked(0) = T ′ = {t1, t2, . . . , th} and associating to each ti ∈
attacked(0) a unique signal si.
If. If SA-v admits a covering route for attacked(0), this means all the tar-
gets in attacked(0) can be covered within their penetration times and thus, by
construction, also T ′ admits a covering route.
Only if. It can be proved following steps similar to the If direction. If T ′ ad-
mits a covering route, then there is also a feasible covering route for attacked(0).

Finally, we observe that, when the starting vertex v and attacked(0) are fixed,
the problem can be solved in O( 2k k5 ), with k being the size of attacked(0),
while in general the problem has a higher complexity, equal toO( |V | 2k k5 (|T |k ) ),
which approximately isO( |V |k+1 2k k5 ). This follows from the algorithm DP-ComputeCovSets,
called SolveSRG(v, T ′) from now on, proposed in [12], where v is the start-
ing vertex and T ′ the set of attacked targets, whose complexity in general is
O(2|T
′| |T ′|5 ). Furthermore, the following result holds.
Theorem 2 SA-v problem is NP-hard on tree graphs.
The proof follows from the reduction reported in the proof of [12, Theorem
1], which exploits instances with a single signal, and can be thus directly applied
to our case.
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6 Facing Sequential Attacks
First, we ask whether it is worth studying the case in which the Attacker can
perform sequential attacks. To answer this question, we show that A can gain
strictly more from sequential attacks with respect to simultaneous attacks, as
stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 There exist patrolling games that can provide a strictly higher
utility to the Attacker when she performs multiple sequential attacks to the tar-
gets rather than a single attack to multiple targets.
Proof. The proof is given by example. Consider the following graph, where
d(t1) = d(t2) = 4, edges are unitary and k = 2.
t1 t2
Figure 2: Linear graph employed in the proof of Proposition 1.
If A can perform only simultaneous attacks to the two targets, D will stay
in t1 (or t2), able to reach t2 (or t1) within its penetration time. Hence, D will
protect both targets. Conversely, if A can attack the two targets sequentially,
it can be observed that, no matter her position, the Defender can only protect
one of the targets, losing the other. For instance, if D stays in t1 (or t2), A will
attack t2 (or t1). Subsequently, if D does not move to cover t2 (or t1), then
the target under attack is lost. Otherwise, if D moves to cover t2 (or t1), then
A will attack t1 (or t2) immediately after the first move of D and thus D cannot
cover both targets. 
In the rest of the section, we investigate the best defense strategy for the
Defender when the Attacker can perform sequential attacks. Specifically, Sec-
tion 6.1 tackles the problem when the Attacker can perform two sequential
attacks, i.e., k = 2, while Section 6.2 generalizes such scenario to the ones in
which the Attacker may perform an arbitrary number k of attacks.
6.1 Two Sequential Attacks
We can formalize the game with k = 2 as follows. At the root of the game tree,
the Defender chooses a vertex to place her resource. Then, the Attacker selects
her action: she may attack two targets with a simultaneous attack, generating
|T |(|T | − 1) nodes, or attack one target or wait, thus generating |T |+ 1 nodes.
In the case the Attacker makes two simultaneous attacks or performs the second
attack, the subgame can be solved by invoking SolveSRG (if the attacks are not
simultaneous the penetration time of the first attacked target must be reduced
by the number of turns the first attack is ongoing). Otherwise, D has at most
|V | actions, corresponding to the vertices adjacent to vs. For each of these
actions, we have again |T |(|T | − 1) and |T |+ 1 nodes. The construction of the
tree is performed iterating this process. Thus, the number of nodes at turn
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τ is
∑τ
l=1 |T |(|T | − 1)|V |l. In principle, the game tree is infinite, making the
computation of the equilibrium intractable.
The fact that the attacks may be sequential makes covering routes unsuit-
able. In fact, a covering route should specify a set of targets protected by the
patroller, but with sequential attacks, a covering route at a given turn may not
be covering after a further attack. We thus extend the concept of direct route,
generalizing it as follows.
Definition 5 (Route) Given attacked(0), a route is a couple r = (pr, Tr),
where pr = (pr(0), . . . , pr(h)) is a sequence of arbitrary finite length h, with
pr(i) being any vertex of G, and Tr = (Tr(0), . . . , Tr(j)) is the set containing all
the targets under attack reached by the patroller within their penetration times
during her moving along pr.
Any other target t not appearing in Tr is not visited or visited after d(t) turns
from the start of the attack. When D plays a route r, all and only the targets
appearing in Tr are protected. It would appear natural that the Defender still
moves along the shortest paths to go from an attacked target to another one,
thus minimizing the response time. Unfortunately, the following result holds.
Proposition 2 Moving along shortest paths between targets can be a dominated
strategy for the Defender.
Proof. The proof is by an example. Given the graph depicted in Figure 3,
let all the edges be unitary, the penetration times of the targets be equal to
d(t1) = 5, d(t2) = 3, respectively, and the Attacker be able to perform at most
two attacks. Moreover, let vD be the starting position of the patroller and the
first attack be performed against t1. The shortest path to t1 is 〈vD, v5, v4, t1〉:
however, while following this path, if the Attacker perform her second attack
against t2 while the patroller is in v5, one target is necessarily lost. Conversely,
if the patroller moves along 〈vD, v1, v2, v3, t1〉, she can save both targets, inde-
pendently from her current position. This concludes the proof. 
v2D v1 v3 t1
v5 v4
t2
Figure 3: Graph to prove Proposition 2.
To find the best strategy of the patroller, we provide the following exact
algorithm, PathFinder.
Let the first attack be performed against target t′ with the patroller in vs.
Our goal is to figure out if we can cover t′ within its penetration time and, if
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Algorithm 1 PathFinder(vs, t
′)
1: ∀i, j ∈ V × V,M(i, j) = (rsi, rcij , uij)← (〈·〉, 〈·〉, 0)
2: M(s, 1) = (〈vs〉, 〈·〉, 0)
3: for all j, i ∈ V × V s.t. M(i, j) 6= (〈·〉, 〈·〉, 0) do
4: (rcmin, umin)← AttackPrediction(vi, t′, j)
5: M(i, j)← (·, rcmin,min(umin, uij))
6: for all (vi, vadj) ∈ E do
7: if uij ≤ uadj,j+1 then
8: M(adj, j + 1)← (〈rsi, vadj〉, ·, uij)
9: u∗ ← max(u1|V |, u|V ||V |)
10: return (r∗, rc,∗, u∗)←M(i, j)|M(i, j) = (·, ·, u∗)
Algorithm 2 AttackPrediction(v, t′, j)
1: d(t′)← d(t′)− j
2: for all t ∈ T, t 6= t′ do
3: (R,U)← SolveSRG(v, {t} ∪ {t′})
4: return (rcmin, umin)← (arg min
i
Ui,min
i
Ui)
so, what route should be followed. PathFinder builds the paths from vs to
t′ incrementally, assuming that the second attack may be performed at each
step towards t′, and solving this problem by invoking the AttackPrediction
algorithm. PathFinder uses a |V |×|V |matrix M , where each element M(i, j) =
(rsi, r
c
ij , uij) consists of the route rsi from vs to vi, the best covering route r
c
ij
from vertex vi at time instant j to cover the targets under attack and the utility
uij for D associated to such route. The rows represent the vertices of the graph
while the columns represent the time steps. Each cell is initialized to (〈·〉, 〈·〉, 0)
except for the one corresponding to the starting point, M(vs, 1), which contains
the route constituted only by vs (Algorithm 1, Lines 1-2). M is filled column
by column, as time passes by (Algorithm 1, Lines 3-8). PathFinder processes
elements of M corresponding to visited vertices. Let us focus on a cell of the
matrix, M(i, j). AttackPrediction is called on vi (Algorithm 1, Line 4): first,
it reduces the penetration time of t′ according to the turn we are considering,
then it calls SolveSRG to obtain the set of covering routes R that should be
followed if the second attack would happen against t 6= t′ with D in vi at time
instant j and the utilities U associated to the routes (Algorithm 2, Lines 2-3).
After performing such computation, since A will carry on her second attack in
our worst-case scenario, the algorithm saves the covering route and the value
corresponding to the worst attack in rcmin, umin, respectively, (Algorithm 2,
Line 4) and return them back. The values of the current cell are updated, taking
rcmin and the minimum value between umin and the previous one contained in
the cell, namely uij (Algorithm 1, Line 5). The values of the cells corresponding
to vertices vadj adjacent to vi are also updated: if the minimum value between
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the previous one contained in M(adj, j + 1) and the updated value of uij is
the latter, the route from vs to vi to which vadj is appended and uij are saved
(Algorithm 1, Lines 6-8). Finally, the algorithm returns the element of M
containing the highest utility for the Defender (Algorithm 1, Line 10), i.e.,
either the best path to reach t′ or standing still in vs.
Theorem 3 PathFinder computes the equilibrium path of the game, returning
the optimal solution for the Defender.
Proof. We report the proof, based on the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 At the equilibrium, the size of the game tree is finite.
Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that the patroller will never visit twice the
same node and so the path of the Defender cannot be longer than |V |. Moreover,
Lemma 2 tell us that the second attack will be performed while the patroller is
traveling to cover the first target. Thus, the depth of the game tree is limited
by |V |. 
Lemma 2 Let the first attack being performed against target t′ with the patroller
in vs. Then, the Attacker will perform the second attack while the patroller is
moving from vs to t
′.
Proof. We consider the second attack occurring when the Defender is going
from vs to t
′ along p and on her way back, from t′ to vs, following path p′
(following a path different from p on the way back is a dominated action). If
the Attacker can complete the attack while D is moving along p′, then the same
attack can also be completed when she is moving along p. But if the Attacker
cannot complete the attack while D is going back to vs, then A might be able
to complete the attack when D is traveling along p according to the patrolling
policy.
Lemma 3 Let the first attack be performed against target t′ with the patroller
in vs. Then, in absence of the second attack, the Defender will never traverse
twice the same vertex along her path from vs to t
′.
Proof. Let p be the path from vs to t
′ followed by D when no other attack
is occurring. Being the graph unitary, the patroller will reach t′ after p time
units. If D should traverse a vertex twice, she would reach t′ in more than p
time units, without getting any increase in terms of utility. Thus, D will follow
p. 
Lemma 4 Let p1, p2 be two paths that visit the same node v at time instant
τ and u1, u2 the utilities obtained considering the worst-attack that can be per-
formed when traveling along such paths. If u1 ≥ u2, then traveling along p1
dominates traveling along p2.
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Proof. After visiting v, both paths will have the same expected utility associated
to the next steps towards t′. Thus, we can compare p1, p2 with respect to their
utilities u′1, u
′
2 in reaching v. Since u1 ≥ u2, then u′1 ≥ u′2 and so traveling along
p1 dominates traveling along p2. 
Because of Lemmas 1–4, we can state that PathFinder evaluates all the so-
lutions among which the optimal ones may be, safely discarding only dominated
ones. Thus, eventually, the algorithm will return the optimal solution, and the
corresponding strategy, for the Defender. This concludes the proof sketch. 
Before running PathFinder, we compute the shortest paths among all the
vertices, with a cost of O(|V 3|) (Floyd-Warshall algorithm [22]). We build a
matrix M , whose size is |V |2, and the cost of filling each M(i, j) is dominated by
the calls to AttackPrediction, whose cost is |V | (invoking SolveSRG has a cost
that is constant in k since it is a fixed parameter). The complexity of invoking
PathFinder is then O(|V |3). We call PathFinder for each t′ ∈ T , returning
the best routes with the associated utilities. At the end of these executions, we
know which are the best responses for the patroller from vs when any target
is attacked. We repeat this procedure for each vertex v ∈ V , reaching a total
complexity of O(|V |5). After this, the Defender knows, for each vi ∈ V , the
utility u∗vi of placing the patrolling resource in vi and how to best respond from
there to each possible attack. The best starting placement for the patroller is
then v∗ = arg max(u∗v1 , u
∗
v2 , . . . , u
∗
v|V |).
Thus, once k is fixed, the computation of the equilibrium path can be done
in polynomial time. Moreover, if the Attacker is irrational, i.e., playing off the
equilibrium path, PathFinder can still be used to find the best response in
polynomial time.
6.2 Extending to an Arbitrary Number of Sequential At-
tacks
The extension of PathFinder to an arbitrary number of resources is involved:
in order to introduce the new features, we first investigate what happens when
the Attacker performs the first attack with k − 1 resources, and then we apply
the proposed approach to the most general case.
Let us analyze what happens if A performs her first attack employing k− 1
resources. We introduce two additional features with respect to PathFinder.
First, we add a third dimension to M , say l, considering all the combinations
with repetitions of the k−1 targets under attack (a target that has already been
attacked but not successfully compromised can be attacked again). We move
along l according to the currently active targets, thus excluding targets covered
by the patroller or those that have been successfully attacked by the Attacker.
Moreover, we need to explicitly keep track of the targets that have actually
been covered by the patroller. Indeed, since there could be multiple attacks, the
Defender may traverse some target after it has been successfully attacked, but
we should not include it among the targets that have been successfully covered.
Thus, each element of M also contains the set of covered targets.
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We follow steps similar to PathFinder, filling M column by column and for
increasing l, calling an extended version of AttackPrediction that takes as
input the subset of targets T ′ under attack. According to the targets that have
been successfully attacked by the Attacker and the ones covered by the cover-
ing route, we fill the corresponding cell of M by inserting covered targets, the
corresponding route and value, and then we update the elements of the cells of
the adjacent vertices by adopting the same rationale employed by PathFinder.
Once M has been completely processed, we select the last matrix along the l di-
mension and apply the same operations we performed at the end of PathFinder
(Algorithm 1, Lines 9-10), returning the element of M associated with the best
utility for the Defender.
Here, the size of M is |V | · (k − 1)|V | · (|T |+k−1k ) and this time calling
AttackPrediction has a cost equal to O(2kk5) due to the call to SolveSRG. So,
the cost of invoking the extended version of PathFinder isO((|V |+k)k2kk6|V |2).
We run this algorithm for all subsets of k − 1 targets, namely ( |T |k−1), to know
which are the best responses for the patroller from vs when any subset of k− 1
targets is attacked. We then repeat this procedure for each v ∈ V and select
the vertex with the highest utility as the starting placement for the patroller,
reaching a total complexity of O((|V |+ k)k|V |k+22kk6) to solve our problem.
Now let us consider the general case in which A employs k−k′ resources for
the first attack. This means we must solve all the problems with k−k′+1 possible
targets under attack and for each of these, all the problems with k− k′+ 2. We
proceed recursively until we reach problems with k − 1 targets under attack:
we solve these problems as described above and propagate back the solutions,
solving step by step all the problems until we reach the original one.
To compute the solution for the general problem, we have to solve a very
large number of problem, namely
∏k′−1
h=1
( |T |
k−k′+h
) ≈ O(|V |k2), each with the
exponential complexity showed above.
7 Without Complete Information
Till now, we assumed that the Defender a priori knew the number of resources
the Attacker could employ to perform her attack. In real-life scenarios, however,
it is very unlikely that this information is available for the Defender to be used.
A possible approach to face this issue is employing a probability distribution
on the number of resources available to the Attacker, as required in Bayesian
games. Unfortunately, in this case, the problem is even computationally harder,
and the assumption that such a prior is common knowledge is even more unlikely.
Thus, we study the scenario in which knowledge about the number of attacker’s
resources is not common. First, Section 7.1 analyzes the robustness when the
Defender makes a wrong guess on the number of resources actually controlled
by the Attacker, while Section 7.2 proposes two online algorithms to deal with
this problem when the Defender has no information about the number of the
resources.
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7.1 Robustness to a Wrong Guess
In this section, we investigate the scenario in which D makes a guess k′ about
the number of resources available to A, being such a number actually equal
to k. First, as customary done in the literature, we adopt a ratio to evaluate
the quality of the guess: in this case, we consider the ratio between the De-
fender’s utilities obtained with the wrong guess and the correct guess as our
measure 7.1.1. Then, we resort to another index of performance for the guess,
namely, the difference of the Defender’s utilities.
7.1.1 Utility Ratio
Initially, we study the loss in the worst-case for the Defender, i.e., she plays
her best strategy against k′ resources when such guess is wrong. Moreover,
we assume the Attacker to be rational and knowing the guess k′ made by the
Defender. We denote with σ∗D,k and with v
∗
D,k, respectively, the optimal strategy
of the patroller and the value of the equilibrium when the number of resources
available toA is k and the guess is correct. Similarly, vD,k,k′ is the value obtained
by the Defender playing strategy σD,k,k′ when the Attacker has k resources but
the guess is k′, and A plays her best response to σD,k,k′ .
We define the relative loss of a strategy based on a wrong guess with re-
spect to the best strategy based on the correct guess by resorting to the tools
used in online algorithms, where the performance of an algorithm is compared
with respect to the performance of the clairvoyant algorithm, which a priori
knows all the information. In particular, we resort to the concept of competitive
factor [27].
Definition 6 (Competitive factor) The competitive factor Γ of an algorithm
is given by the worst-case ratio vv∗ , where v is the value given by the algorithm
and v∗ is the maximum value given by a clairvoyant algorithm.
We recall that an algorithm is said competitive when Γ > 0. In our case,
the competitive factor when the Defender makes a guess k′ while the Attacker
has k resources is equal to Γ =
vD,k,k′
v∗D,k
, once excluded all the instances in which
v∗D,k = 0.
Before tackling the problem, we have to normalize the values of the targets
onto the interval [0, 1] to have correct values for the competitive factor. Let
Ttopk be a list of targets obtained re-labeling the targets in T in descending
order with respect to pi(t) and selecting the first k. Given an instance where
pi(t) are the initial values for the targets, we change their values as follows:
pi′(t) = pi(t)∑
ti∈Ttopk pi(ti)
. This way, the Defender gets a utility equal to 1 if no
targets are conquered by the Attacker while she gets 0 if all the top k targets
are conquered. In other words, a utility of 0 means that no other outcome is
worse for the Defender.
Now we can state the following.
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Theorem 4 If the Defender makes a wrong guess with respect to the actual
number of resources available to the Attacker, then Γ = 0, independently by the
value of the guess.
Proof. We consider separately the case in which the Defender is underestimating
the number of the attacker’s resources from the case in which she is overesti-
mating it.
Underestimation. Let us consider a graph composed of a clique of size k −
k′ + 1, with unitary edges, k − k′ targets, say tc, with pi(tc) = 1, d(tc) = k − k′,
and the non-target vertex v of the clique connected to k′ other targets, to, with
pi(to) = , d(to) = k, through edges with weight equal to k. If k
′ = k, starting
in v, D will lose at most (k − 1) since she will wait for attacks to targets tc
and, if they happen, the patroller will be able to cover all of them. According
to our normalization, v∗D,k = 1. On the other hand, if k
′ < k, A will employ k′
resources on targets to and k − k′ to attack tc. From v, D will be able to save
only a target to, so vD,k,k′ = . Since Γ = , Γ
→0−−−→ 0.
Overestimation. Let us consider a star graph with unitary edges and k
targets connected to a central node v. The values of the targets are pi(t) = 1− 
except for one target, tmax, whose value is pi(tmax) = 1. From v, if D could
employ the clairvoyant algorithm, she would always be able to save one target,
thus v∗D,k = 1− (k−1)(1−)1+(k−1)(1−) = 11+(k−1)(1−) . On the other side, since A employs
k < k′ resources, the Defender will wait for the last k−k′ targets to be attacked
since tmax could be among them. In this case, vD,k,k′ = 1 − k(1−)1+(k−1)(1−) =

1+(k−1)(1−) . Thus, Γ
→0−−−→ 0. 
The above results shows that playing a strategy that is optimal for a given
guess is not robust in practice since it is sufficient that the guess is wrong just
by one resource to have an arbitrary loss with respect to the optimal clairvoyant
solution.
7.1.2 Utility Difference
As shown in the previous section, considering just the ratio of the utilities may
not be very informative since making an error when performing a guess can lead
to an arbitrary loss.
This is why we turn our attention to another index that could be more
significant for our setting, i.e., the difference between the Defender’s utilities
computed when w.r.t the guessed number of resources and the correct number
of resources adopted by the Attacker, respectively. Moreover, adopting such a
criterion is also suggested by the concept of the -Nash equilibrium [47], which
is commonly adopted when dealing with robustness analysis of games subject
to perturbations.
Definition 7 (Additive competitive factor) The additive competitive fac-
tor Γ′ of an algorithm is given by the worst-case difference v−v∗, where v is the
value given by the algorithm and v∗ is the maximum value given by a clairvoyant
algorithm.
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We observe that Γ′ has been defined such that, if the guess is wrong, it
results negative, meaning the Defender is incurring in some loss. In this case,
adopting a similar approach, it can proved that the loss strictly depends on
the difference between the guess k′ of the Defender and the actual number of
resources available to the Attacker, i.e., k, as stated in the following.
Theorem 5 If the Defender makes a wrong guess with respect to the actual
number of resources available to the Attacker, then Γ′ is equal to:
Γ′ =

−(k − k′) + , k′ < k
−(k′ − k)(1− ), k < k′ < 2k
−k(1− ), k′ ≥ 2k.
where k′ is the number of resources guessed by the Defender while k is the actual
number of resources controlled by the Attacker.
Proof. We consider separately the case in which the Defender is underestimating
the number of the attacker’s resources from the case in which she is overesti-
mating it.
Underestimation. Let us consider a graph composed of a clique of size k −
k′ + 1, with unitary edges, k − k′ targets, say tc, with pi(tc) = 1, d(tc) = k,
and the non-target vertex v of the clique connected to k′ other targets, to, with
pi(to) = , d(to) = k, through edges with weight equal to k. If k
′ = k, starting
in v, D will lose at most k′ due to attacks on targets to since she will wait for
attacks to targets tc and, if they happen, the patroller will be able to cover all
of them. Thus, v∗D,k = −k′. Conversely, if k′ < k, A will employ k′ resources
on targets to and k−k′ to attack tc. From v, D will be able to save only a target
to, so vD,k,k′ = −k− (k′ − 1). Thus, Γ′ = −k− (k′ − 1)− k′ = −(k− k′) + .
Overestimation. We consider two different cases, first evaluating what hap-
pens if k < k′ ≥ 2k and then considering the case k′ > 2k.
k < k′ ≥ 2k. Let us consider a graph composed of a clique of size k′− k+ 1,
with unitary edges, k′−k targets, say tc, with pi(tc) = 1, d(tc) = k′−k, and the
non-target vertex v of the clique connected to k other targets to through edges
with weight equal to k, with such targets characterized by pi(to) = 1− , d(to) =
k′ − k. Targets to are connected to each other by edges with weight equal to
1, forming a clique. If k′ = k, it can be seen that, because of the structure of
the instance, the best strategy of the Attacker is to perform half of the attacks
against targets tc and the other half against targets to. The worst case is when k
is odd, inflicting the Defender a loss equal to (2k−k′)(1−), since she will prefer
to save the targets tc with respect to to since protecting the former guarantees
her a lower loss. Thus, v∗D,k = −(2k − k′)(1− )
If k < k′ ≥ 2k, A will employ k resources to attack targets on to. If the
Defender moves to defend these targets, she knows the Attacker will perform
the remaining k′ − k attacks against tc targets. This way, the Defender loss
would be equal to 1 + (k− 1)(1− ), since she would be able to save only one to
target and k − 1 tc targets, losing all the others. Conversely, if D stands still,
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despite losing all the to targets, she would be able to save all the tc targets, and
so her loss would be equal t k(1−). Since standing still the loss of the Defender
is smaller, she will adopt this strategy. Thus, vD,k,k′ = −k(1 − ) This means
that Γ′ = −k(1− ) + (2k − k′)(1− ) = −(k′ − k)(1− ).
k′ > 2k. Let us consider a graph composed of a clique of size k′−k+1, with
unitary edges, k′ − k targets, say tc, with pi(tc) = 1, d(tc) = k+ 1, and the non-
target vertex v of the clique connected to k other targets to through edges with
weight equal to k, with such targets characterized by pi(to) = 1−, d(to) = k+1.
Targets to are connected to each other by edges with weight equal to 1, forming
a clique. If k′ = k, it can be seen that, because of the structure of the instance,
from v the Defender will be able to save all the targets, independently of the
sequence with which they are performed. Thus, v∗D,k = 0. If k
′ > 2k, A will
employ k resources to attack targets on to. If the Defender moves to defend these
targets, she knows the Attacker will perform the remaining k′−k attacks against
tc targets. This way, the Defender loss would be equal to 1+(k−1)(1−), since
she would be able to save only one to target and k − 1 tc targets, losing all the
others. Conversely, if D stands still, despite losing all the to targets, she would
be able to save all the tc targets, and so her loss would be equal to k(1−). Since
standing still the loss of the Defender is smaller, she will adopt this strategy.
Thus, vD,k,k′ = −k(1− ). This means that Γ′ = −k(1− )− 0 = −k(1− ).
This concludes the proof. 
Observation 1 The above values for Γ′ are tight.
• Underestimation: Γ′ →0−−−→ −(k−k′). This is the highest value the Attacker
can get since she must employ k′ resources to deceive the Defender, who
otherwise will wait for a possible attack against a high-valuable target.
• Overestimation, k < k′ ≥ 2k: Γ′ →0−−−→ −(k′− k). This is the highest value
the Attacker can get since, being the guess strictly smaller than 2k, she
must employ some resources to deceive the Defender, who will move to
block the resources and save some targets.
• Overestimation, k′ > 2k: Γ′ →0−−−→ −k. This is the biggest loss the Attacker
can inflict to the Defender with k resources.
Moreover, notice that when k < k′ ≥ 2k, the loss increase of one unit as the
guess is bigger than one unit with respect to k. This holds until we reach k′ = 2k,
where the loss is equal to k. Here, the loss obtained in the two overestimating
cases smoothly connect, since for k′ > 2k the loss is constantly equal to k.
7.2 Online Algorithms
We have seen that if the guess of the Defender on the number of resources
available to the Attacker is wrong, underestimating or, more surprisingly, over-
estimating such number leads to an arbitrarily small value for D. Thus, we ask
whether there exists a competitive online algorithm that is independent of the
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actual number of resources of the Attacker, just relying only on the observed
attacks, so that can circumvent the problem.
Theorem 6 There is no deterministic online competitive algorithm with a com-
petitive factor better than 1k−1 , where k is the actual number of resources avail-
able to the Attacker.
Proof. Let us consider the following instance. A vertex v is connected to
max{1, k − 1} targets, with deadlines equal to max{1, 2k − 1} through uni-
tary edges, and to tf with an edge whose cost is 2k, where d(tf ) = 2k. The
value of all the targets is pi(t) = 1.
We split the proof considering first k = 1 and then k > 1. If k = 1, with
the patroller in v, the optimal strategy for D is to protect the first target under
attack, obtaining a value of 1. Any online algorithm that does not prescribe to
cover the first target under attack will have a competitive factor equal to 0 since
the Defender will take 0. If k > 1, the optimal strategy for the Defender is to
cover the first target under attack if and only if such target is not tf . This way,
in the optimal case, the Defender will take a utility of k−1k , protecting all the
targets except for one. Conversely, any strategy prescribing to defend tf when
attacked as the first target would lead to a competitive factor of 1k−1 . Thus, the
best competitive factor is 1k−1 . 
It is now worth asking whether we can achieve a better result employing
randomization3.
Theorem 7 Let Γd be the best competitive factor of a deterministic online al-
gorithm. There exists a randomized online algorithm with competitive factor Γr
such that Γr > Γd and, asymptotically, Γr → Γd.
Proof. We prove the theorem only in the worst case for deterministic online
algorithms. This allows us to show the improvement one can obtain by means
of randomization in the worst case.
Let us consider a graph composed of a clique with unitary edges of k−h+ 1
nodes, k−h of which are targets, say tc, with d(tc) = k−h, and the non-target
vertex v of the clique connected to h other targets, to, with d(to) = k, through
edges with weight equal to k. pi(tc) = pi(to) = 1.
We know from Theorem 6 that a deterministic approach reaches a competi-
tive factor Γd =
1
k−1 . We propose the following randomized algorithm: let v be
the starting point for D and, whenever an attack occurs, she has probability 12
of protecting the target under attack while she stands still in v with probability
1
2 . Since we want to compute Γr, we normalize the values of the targets dividing
them by k. If there are multiple sequential attacks on targets to, the utility of
protecting them is equal to 1k
(
1
2 +
1
4 + · · ·+ 12h
)
= 12k
∑h
i=0
(
1
2
)i
while standing
still and covering attacks against tc gives a utility equal to
(
1
2
)h k−h
k . The clair-
voyant algorithm achieves a utility of k−hk . Thus, Γr =
1
2k
∑h
i=0( 12 )
i
+( 12 )
h k−h
k
k−h
k
=
3In this work, we just open the path to the study of this problem, aware that this a
fundamental question we will further investigate in future works.
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1
k−h
(
1− ( 12)h+1)+ ( 12)h. Among all the instances, we want to find the worst,
so, given k, we want to minimize Γr with respect to h. In the following table, we
report the values of Γr and Γd achieved for different k, taking the h minimizing
Γr.
k 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 100
Γr 0.87 0.69 0.54 0.44 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.01
Γd 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.01
As it can be seen, for small values, a very simple randomized algorithm can
ensure a competitive factor that is twice better than the one achieved by a
deterministic algorithm. Moreover, Γr
k→∞−−−−→ Γd. 
8 Conclusions and Future Research
In this work, we investigated the opportunities an Attacker can take when she
can perform multiple attacks, simultaneously or sequentially, in an arbitrary
environment, modeled as a graph. The challenge is due to the high interaction
level among the players, e.g., the Attacker can use resources to make the pa-
troller move away from some valuable targets and, subsequently, attack those
targets. Since the problem presents an explicit representation of the passing of
time, we modeled it as an extensive-form game. In principle, an equilibrium
can be found in polynomial time in the size of the game tree, but, here, the
game tree induced by our model is exponentially large in the size of the graph
and in the number of resources available to the Attacker. When the number
of resources is a fixed parameter, the problem admits an algorithm capable of
finding the strategies on the equilibrium path requiring polynomial time in the
size of the graph. Conversely, we show that there is no algorithm requiring
polynomial time in the number of Attacker’s resources, unless P = NP, even in
the simplified case in which the Attacker uses all her resources simultaneously.
Unfortunately, computing the equilibrium strategies requires the knowledge on
the number of Attacker’s resources. Since it is unlikely to have this informa-
tion, we studied the robustness of a Defender’s strategy when the guess about
the number of resources the Attacker can employ is wrong. We evaluated the
worst-case inefficiency of this strategy showing that it can be arbitrary even
when the guess is a wrong estimate—both over and under—for just a single
resource. We also investigated the problem looking at an additive competitive
factor, according to an -Nash equilibrium fashion. Furthermore, we investi-
gated the use of online algorithms to adopt when no information is available
to the Defender. We provided a tight upper bound over the competitive factor
when non-stochastic online algorithms are used, and we show that the factor
can be improved by resorting to randomization.
The work presented in this paper can be extended along different directions.
We could enrich our model with respect to the uncertainties that characterize
the alarm system, introducing false positives. Even though an Attacker with
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multiple resources could actually recreate a similar effect, performing an attack
just to deceive the Defender and then attacking her main target, this is not the
same as having the system affected by such an issue. In fact, the Attacker could
exploit this flaw, while the Defender should decide whether it is convenient or
not to move from her current position. Similarly, we could add the presence of
missed detections, i.e., even though an attack is occurring, no signal is raised
by the system. This drawback affects all commercial alarm system, and thus it
would be another important step towards a more realistic model. Finally, we
could deepen the impact an Attacker can have with various resources, being able
to damage the targets at different levels. This would lead to consider different
levels of damage for the targets, giving the Attacker the possibility to stop an
ongoing attack once a certain damage threshold is reached.
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A Notation Table
We report in Table 2 the symbols used throughout the paper.
Symbol Meaning
B
as
ic
m
o
d
el
A Attacker
D Defender
G = (V,E) Graph constituted by the set of vertices V and the set of edges E
v Vertex
(v, v′) Edge
ω∗v,v′ Temporal cost (in turns) of the shortest path between v and v
′
T Set of targets
t Target
ti i-th target
pi(t) Value of target t
d(t) Penetration time of target t
S
ig
n
al
s
S Set of signals
si Signal associated to target ti
p Function specifying the probability of having the system generating
signal s given that target t has been attacked
T (s) Targets having a positive probability of raising s if attacked
S(t) Signals having a positive probability of being raised if t is attacked
A
ct
io
n
s,
ro
u
te
s,
st
ra
te
gi
es
τ Turn of the game
attacked(τ) Set of targets attacked at tutn τ
(τ, attacked(τ)) Action for the Attacker
k Number of resources available to the Attacker
r Route, i.e., sequence of potentially non-adjacent vertices
ri i-th route
r(i) i-th element visited along route r
R Set of routes
A(r(i)) Time needed by D to visit r(i) starting from r(0)
T (r) Set of targets covered by route r
c(r) Temporal cost (in turns) associated to r
O
n
li
n
e
an
al
y
si
s Γ Multiplicative competitive factor
Γ′ Additive competitive factor
σ∗D,k Optimal Defender’s strategy against k attacks
σ∗D,k,k′ Defender’s strategy when she guesses k
′ attacks
v∗D,k Optimal Defender’s utility against k attacks
vD,k,k′ Defender’s utility when she guesses k′ attacks
and Aperform k attacks
Table 2: Symbols’ table.
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